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Abstract
Title of dissertation: The Role of ROs in the Case of Forgery and Fraud Affecting
Honduran Ship Certificates.
Degree: Master of Science.
This dissertation it is intended to evaluate from a country´s point of view, how the
delegation of authorities to ROs might be harmful to some maritime administrations,
and how it can become counterproductive for the performance of the administration as
well, as a latent danger for the security and safety of navigation.
In like manner, to present a notion of circumstances by which under legal delegation
agreement could be a high probability of fraudulent actions, which could take place
without the knowledge of the maritime administrations, all of this in the role of the
ROs, with a legal delegation agreement.
The study will be focusing on some recent and actual cases that took place in the
country of Honduras; this does not mean that is the only member state that has faced
this kind of illegal actions by some ROs,
Nevertheless, the cases will help to provide a baseline to understand better the fraud
and forgery through cases that have not been reported of detected, and if so, there is
not much that can be done at a national level.
The topic of phantom ships was also touched upon, as a part of the issue related to
fraud and forgery in the role of ROs; many certificates onboard those ships do form
part of this phenomena of fraud and forgery of certificates, it is hoped that this work
will unveil the lack of a proper external supervision of the ROs.
Finally, the purpose of this dissertation is that there can be of help to develop new
instruments to fight these illegal actions.
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1. Introduction
This dissertation is a study of forgery and fraud of documents as a persistent and
increasingly worrying phenomenon, within the maritime industry in the role of the
recognized organizations, in the case of ships flying under the Honduras flag, under
the prescription of authority delegation agreement.
This phenomenon has become a latent hazard to the safety and security of the maritime
industry; it is not a countries' exclusive occurrence but an international issue that needs
immediate attention;
There has to be a complete collaboration of the stakeholders involved in maritime
trade, at a national and international level for this matter to be extinguished.
The mechanisms of prevention, timely detection, and proper response to the many
unsolved and existing cases have to be activated, and these should become the
responsibility of the international community as a whole.
Member states are responsible for the proper application of all the mandatory
instruments, emanating from the IMO regarding the control, supervision, and
enforcement of the role of the recognized organizations, as well as their performance,
but this is not enough, there is the need for external supervision.
In promotion of the safety of navigation, prevention of maritime incidents and
accidents, as well prevention marine pollution, this research has the objective to
analyze new and existing means for the prevention and detection of fraud and forgery
within the scope of action of the Recognize Organizations acting on behalf of the
administrations.
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Equally important, is to mention that IMO has created tools and guidelines to aid the
member states in the supervision, control, and enforcement of the ROs, but is up to the
member states to supply the systems with the proper and updated information required;
It is here where many states fail, and since there are no dissuasive methods, the gap
for fraud and forgery is created, diminishing the safety and security of the seaborne
trade.
To give the full effect of the IMO instruments there has to be proper enforcement of
the Flag State Control, Port State Control, and Costal State through various national
legal guidance as well as the cooperation between states, is this an achievable task?
The author will unveil certain aspects that are a milestone in accomplishing them,
through with this dissertation.
In many cases, though there has been proper application of international instruments,
and some states have applied suitable national procedures and legislation; there still
the possibility of some irregularities to happen regarding the role of ROs.
Disturbing enough, is the fact that this might go undetected for some time, and that
time might be crucial to avoid a major disaster.
The International Maritime Organization, to have a more effective control of the
proper implementation of the international conventions and regulation instituted the
IMO Member State Audit Scheme [1](IMSAS), which now is mandatory since 1 of
January 2016.
Unfortunately, this does not contemplate many security breaches, even though this
aspect should have been detected in the Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme
(VIMSAS) that took place before, but it was omitted or not detected.
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1.1 Objectives of the study
This ambitious topic was decided after many incidents were noticed to be happening
incessantly and in some cases these were overlooked;
Interesting enough IMO, specialized entity of the UN in charged for the safety and
security of shipping, has not issued enough awareness on this matter, and has centered
all efforts to battle against the fraudulent certificates of competency of the seafarers,
but not the equally relevant and dangerous issue of fraudulent certificates issued by
ROs on behalf of the maritime administrations (IMO, www.imo.org, 2019)
It seems that IMO has turned its backs to the issue, and has not given much importance
to the fact that there are so many ROs offering their maritime services to many
countries, ship owners and many other stakeholders;
Moreover, in many cases these ROs do not have the installed capacity to do so, or they
devote their work to issue forged documents or forge certificates to many vessels that
do not comply with the various safety and security requirements of the international
conventions.
The author has tried to epitomize this problem, and how it has become evident that it
is not a new problem, but a persistent one, an issue that has a direct effect on the safety
and security of the maritime industry, our seas, and the marine environment.
Throughout the present dissertation, the author intends to try to:
 Identify the weaknesses when it comes to the delegation to the recognized
organizations when it comes to the requirements for the delegation itself.
 To analyze the importance of the Port State Control (PSC) when ensuring the
legality of the technical certificates.
 Describe in a whole the traditional fraudulent situation in the roles of the
recognized organizations through study cases.
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 Identify a range of procedures to avoid the fraud and forgery of documents in
the role of the recognized organizations.
 Prescribe possible ways on how member states can help fight this persistent
issue.
Moreover, these will take the author to demonstrate, that there is an urgent need to
develop a system to control and be able to sanction the ROs that might be involved in
these cases of fraud, from an international scope;
Many of these objectives can be seen as ambitious, but there are realistic and
reasonable and buoyantly; the present dissertation will provide a helpful contribution
to prevent as well as to uncover some of the latent weaknesses of many maritime
administrations when delegating and supervising the recognized organizations.

1.2 Scope of the study
This Dissertation, comprises five chapters;
Chapter 1, introduction, the general historical background will be found, as well as the
objective and the methodology with its limitations and sources of the present
dissertation.
Chapter 2, will contain the responsibilities of the ROs, from a contractual point of view
as well as the efficiencies found in the delegation agreement that is given to the ROs
by the maritime administrations; including the implementation of the international
guidelines.
Chapter 4, will proceed to give a comprehensive discussion of the cases and findings
that were disclosed in chapter 2 as well as chapter 3.
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Chapter 5, will provide the conclusion and the recommendations based on the overall
research work to provide possible solutions that can be implemented at national and
international instances to fighting the problem of fraud and forgery of certificates in
the role of ROs.

1.3 The methodology, source and limitations.
Limitations
In the first instance, the author proposed and developed a specialized questionnaire
specifically aimed to be answered by the maritime administrations of the 35 countries
that have open registries status, which was approved by the Research Ethics
Committee (REC);
The objective of the questionnaire was to draw information about several ROs
delegated by member states, national procedures to verify compliance of the ROs with
the international guidelines, as well as to have information of cases of fraud and
forgery in the role of ROs. (ITF, 2019)
The information was sent via e-mail to the 35 administrations, only three
administrations answered, in the case of the others the information was denied for
privacy issues allegations;
Even though this information should be part of the information that has to be of a
public status through the Global Integrated Shipping Information System (IMO,
A.1029(26), 2010)
Sources
Information readily available from Honduras, as well as the annual reports of the
MoUs, and the relevant sources as the reports of the International Association of the
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Classification Societies, it was decided to be used as the relevant sources for this
research.
Methodology
The primary methodology for undertaking this research was done with a qualitative
approach since it was performed with the private at a national level data (Honduras)
and accessed public data offered by the MoUs as well as the IACS.
The reason why this methodology was chosen it is because is the best resource to
undertake a comparative analysis of the performance of the ROs, as well as the data
will be more trustworthy since the data is a public element that has pass through all
the proper channels;
In the case of Honduras, the information of study cases was readily available, the
access to the maritime administration was fast and direct; the cases where recent and
there was all the information at hand that was related to the topic of forgery and fraud.

1.4 General historical perspective.
As a significant increase of the maritime trade in the 18th century, was the initial cause
for the classification societies to entered into the picture.

The insurers needed quality standards for ships, to verify the standards were complying
with, and where high standard as well; that is where classification societies entered
into the picture, the setting of the standards for hull, machinery and the equipment
required onboard as well as the maintenance of it were created. (J.Lux, 1993)

Throughout the year, classification societies have made a unique contribution to
maritime safety, by giving technical support, compliance verifications and research
and developments;
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The classification design covers more than 90% of the world's cargo carrying tonnage,
construction and through-life, compliance rules and standards set by the classification
societies are a key in the maritime trade.

Also, classification societies undertake functions delegated by the maritime
administrations, to be in charge on behalf of the member states to ensure that the
vessels are complying with the international conventions and guidelines.
Even though classification societies, meaning strictly, the 1IACS, where at some point
more prevalent nowadays are not the only ones that can provide the services of
classification and certification.
It is essential to distinguish the Classification Societies and the recognized
organization, these last ones, will be the subject of this dissertation; nevertheless, in a
like manner both figures serve the same purpose in the maritime industry;

Therefore, both can be defined as a number of organizations that are dedicated among
others things to develop and apply technical standards for the design, construction and
survey of ships and as well to carry out surveys and inspections onboard ships.
(European Maritime Safety Agency, 2019)

Equally important is to have clear that all classification societies are recognized
organization but not all recognize organizations are classification societies;

1

American Bureau of Shipping (ABS): A1; Bureau Veritas (BV): I; China Classification Society (CCS): CSA 5/5; Croatian
Register of Shipping (CRS): 100A1; Det Norske Veritas (DNV): 1A1; Germanischer Lloyd (GL): 100 A5; Indian Register of
Shipping (IRS): SUL; Korean Register of Shipping (KRS): KRS1; Lloyd’s Register (LR): 100A1; Nippon Kaiji Kyokai
(ClassNK): NS; Polish Register of Shipping (PRS): KM; Registro Italiano Navale (RINA): 100-A-1.1 or C; Russian Maritime
Register of Shipping (RS): KM
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The above statement, is due to that worldwide there are more than 100 classification
societies, that provide their services to many IMO member states, but the European
Commission presently recognizes only 12 classification societies. (Jessen, 2014)

IACS stands for International Association of Classification Societies. A classification
society´s membership in IACS leads to that class society being recognized and
authorized by European Union Member States and the European Commission.

The delegation agreement has been given to various ROs that are not IACS members,
and in many cases, the performance of these organizations have at some level damaged
the performance of the flag states before the international organizations.

Even though ROs has been part of the development of the Honduras maritime trade,
there is still no national legislation for the proper supervision and sanction of such
private entities;

Their performance is only restricted as the institutional level, lacking any significative
legal procedure for sanctions or more severe cases, for criminal instances within the
country.
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2. ROs in the context of Honduras
2.1 Introduction:
The author will try to give a broad idea of the participation the recognized ROs have
when exercising the powers of delegation given by the states;

Moreover, the responsibility of both parties; contractual responsibility of the ROs will
also be touching upon from a legal aspect, also the practical aspect of it.

The delegation contract from an evolution point, and the problems of not having a new
and all included version of it, to this point in time might be one of the many reasons
for breaches of contract; outdated contracts format at some point does not harmonize
with the new international regulation issued by IMO regarding the monitoring point of
view.

It is known and also mentions throughout this work that the reason maritime
administrations might require the services of an RO is because of lack of technical
personnel with technical knowledge as well as the international coverage that is
required to keep a supervision of its international fleet,

Having to supervise the international actions done on behalf of the flag thought the
RO come almost impossible to do, and at some point the author will agree that is
contradictory with the international instruments to require this from the
administrations alone.
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2.2 Functions of the recognized organizations
As the Code states it for Recognized Organizations (RO Code), the function of the RO
lies on the fact that virtually all administrations find it necessary to delegate some or
all of the survey and certification work associated with the international conventions,

the above situation may arise from the lack of international representation or enough
qualified personnel, so in synthesis is to undertake the administration´s authority
through a legal delegation.

However, what conditions will lead a MARAD (Maritime Administration) to require
an RO to act on behalf of it? Even if it is allowed by the conventions mention before
there has to certain conditions as the ones listed below;

Delegation of authority can arise from the need for in-depth technical expertise; as it
is the case of Honduras, the world-wide service which some of the ROs can provide
as well as the technical personnel for it could come in handy when the administrations
has a deficit on these aspects.

The most common is the lack of enough technical personnel to undertake all the ship
certifications required by the international instruments; this can be seen in small
countries that do not have a maritime history, as is the history of Honduras.

The delegation will vary from administration to administration, in some cases, this can
be a full delegation, in which the recognized organization, reviews plans, carry out
surveys and issues certificates;

In other cases, there will be a partial delegation, in which the RO reviews plans and
carries out surveys, but where the administration issues the certificates; or limited to a
case by case or geographical basis. (Jessen, 2014)
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As an example, there can be a delegation where only vessels that navigate in national
waters or vessels which port of call is the national port only, as is the case of Honduras
and some of its delegations, and in which the administrations makes use of these three
types of delegation in one.

The above takes place in order to comply as member states of IMO, as stated in
Res.A789 (19) is a responsibility of all administration to take measures necessary to
ensure all vessels flying their flag are always complying with the provision of the
conventions.

Honduras has delegated to date 7 ROs and is in process to delegating four more, to fill
in the gap caused by the lack of international coverage and technical personnel with
the knowledge to comply with requirements of the conventions of survey and
certification that has to be done on behalf of the flag state.

2.3 Responsibilities of the recognized organizations in the Honduras ‘law.
The author would like to start by stating the criteria for the responsibility assessment
of recognized organizations (ROs) and how it has been given in the instruments
developed by IMO, throughout the time it has been shown the evolution of the
following guidelines and conventions:

Resolution A.739(18) provides a series of minimum requirements that should be
complied with by the recognized Organization to be delegated by flag states when
delegating.

Statutory function it can also be found in the Resolution A.789(19) provides detailed
requirements that also describe specifications under the functions of ROs, later on, the
Resolution MSC. 349 (92) gave life to the Code for recognized organization also
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known as the (RO Code) which is a compilation of the international standards and also
a consolidation of the instruments, containing the minimum criteria against which
organizations are asses in order to be recognized and later on delegated with the
authority of the flag states. (IMO, 2013)

In the 5.7.3 of part 2 of the RO code, there is a strict requirement and responsibility
for the recognized organization to undertake the statutory certification as well as
services on the ships acting under the delegation of the administration, in order to
comply with international relevant international instruments;
In the case, the ship is accepted, and the flag stated did not know the building of the
vessel then the RO shall also verify that the ship has complied with all the national
regulations before it proceeds to certify the vessel. (IMO, 2013)
Within the RO Code, numeral 8.1 under general, it expressed authorization for the
recognized organizations on behalf of the administrations to issue statutory
certification as well as services;

this provisions can be found on regulation I/6 of SOLAS 1974, article 13 of LL 66,
regulation 6 of MARPOL Annex I and regulation 8 of MARPOL Annex II and Article
6 of TONNAGE 69, always has to be taken in consideration that this shall not intrude
in other flag´s right. (IMO, 2013)
In the case of Honduras, it was through its national law the "Ley Organica De La
Marina Mercante Nacional" (Organic Law of the National Merchant Marine) in its
2

regulation of inspection, recognition and issuance of certificates of maritime safety of

Honduran registry, states in its 3article 9 that the delegation can take place to specialize

2

Reglamento de inspección, reconocimiento y expedición de Certificados de Seguridad Marítima a buques de registro hondureño.
(Acuerdo N° 000836-B, de 08 de Noviembre de 1995, Gaceta N° 27,800), Acuerdo Reforma 00768-1997 Reforma el Articulo
11 Gaceta Nº 28,163.
3
Articulo 9. - La Dirección General de la Marina Mercante, podrá autorizar a través de un contrato, que entidades especializadas
de reconocido prestigio internacional y honorabilidad, efectúen en su nombre las inspecciones a buques de bandera Hondureña y
también podrá facultarlas para que emitan los certificados a que aluden el Artículo 4 de este reglamento
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entities if renown international prestige and honorability, who will assume the
inspection and registration of ships under the Honduras flag, as well as the issuance of
other certificates.

The above requirement are part of security measure that will ensure that the RO has
been given a good performance rank among the rest;
It is within the Organic Law of the Merchant Marine in the regulation of inspection,
recognition, and issuance of certificates of maritime safety of Honduran registry, that
is has been dedicated 4articles 9 to 20 only to express the legal requirements that the
ROs have to fulfill in order to be delegated, these to try and delegate only to
organizations that will have a high-quality performance, as it will be shown ahead, not
always an effective legal measure.

2.4 Contractual responsibilities of the ROs.
As stated previously, the IMO conventions may allow external actors to act though
delegation of the legal rights within host states for specific terms in the delegation
agreement, before the previous requirement is filled, as well as it is stated in the
5

Honduran Organic Law.

Some of these agreements are not well instituted, and in some more severe cases, some
might lack legitimacy, because at some point the ratification of some international
instruments, does require sufficient national legal support from abiding body.

Honduras has only one source of maritime law as specialized in the topic of recognized
organizations, and that is the 6Organic Law of the National Merchant Marine, such
instrument lacks enough guidelines, and it can be very vague in some issues as is in
the case sanctions of such organizations that will be delegated.

4

Ibid., Pg. 28
Ibid., Pg. 28
6
Ley Orgánica de la Marina Mercante Nacional, Decreto No. 167-94
5
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It is essential to mention that it has been observed how stronger member states, tend
to delegate less legal authority to the external actor; it can be since stronger member
stated have the install capacity to deal with inspections and certifications of their fleets.
(Matanock, 2014)

Before the author tries to give a solid start to the chapter, it will be appropriate to state
that there are two types of delegations, depending on the needs of the member state
these can be partial or total, and this will be delegated as well as stated in the delegation
agreement.

Depending on the level of delegation is accurate to say, that at some point a certain
amount of sovereignty is being transferred to a private entity, therefore the need to
report to the International Maritime Organization to whom and what the member state
will be delegating.

Furthermore, as stated in Article III of the 1978 and 1988 SOLAS Protocols and article
III of the 1978 MARPOL Protocol instructs that the parties to SOLAS Protocols and
MARPOL 73/78 shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the IMO specific
responsibilities and conditions of authorities delegated to the ROs. (IMO,
COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION ON THE AUTHORIZATION OF
RECOGNIZED ORGANIZATIONS (ROs), 2010)

IMO through MSC/Circ.1010-MEPC/Circ.382, all the members shall report the
information of ROs that been delegated, what level of authority has been delegated to
them, but the member states have not followed the guideline, information is missing
or incomplete.
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The lacking of reporting to IMO through GISIS might eventually have some
repercussions, since there is no database where other member states or stakeholder can
verify the documents that have been issued in the name of a member state through
particular ROs.

The lacking of reporting has led to the phenomenon called by IMO "Phantom Ship,"
this are ships sailing under the flag of state without their knowledge and under
dangerous security and safety conditions.

There are three parties involved when it comes to the application and performance of
the ROs, the MARADS, the OMI and the RO itself, and there are two parties that
intercede with each other to create contractual responsibilities, these two are the
MARADS and the ROs based on the guidelines of the International Maritime
Organization, the responsibility therefore exist and there are enough reasons for it to
be enforced.

Initially, it required each maritime administration to have a formal legal agreement
with the each recognized to whom it will delegate the statutory functions, and this
delegation agreement will be containing the rights and obligations of each party;

Likewise, it required verification system by the administration, to monitor the activity
of the ROs; furthermore, to set out minimum requirements and responsibilities for
the ROs, that this will have to fulfill in order to be delegated and carry our statutory
functions on behalf of a State through the maritime administration.
In the case of 7Honduras the requirements to request a delegation agreement are the
following:
I.

7

A written request to the General Director of the Merchant Marine of Honduras;

This requirements where made by the author of this dissertation and are the actual requirements used in the
maritime administration of Honduras up to date, it applies to all ROs requesting to be delegated.
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II.
III.

The Objectives and the experience of the organization;
An authenticated copy of the legal, commercial registration of the Organization
to operate with in the country;

IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.

Valid ISO 9001:2015 certificate and quality norms and procedures;
Samples of the previous contracts with other countries;
A list of ships to which the organization provider their maritime services;
A list of the technical personnel they have in the main office;
A sample of the certificates to be issued in Spanish and English;
A list of the surveyors professionally qualified ( signatures, identification
numbers, telephone numbers, email address and where are they
geographically)

X.

The curriculum vitae have to show that they are technically competent to offer
their services in compliance with Section 4.5 part B of the PISP code.

XI.

To have documents of design and implementation of the management system
for the elaboration and evaluation of the protection plans.

XII.

Handbook of rules and resolutions of the company.

XIII.

The legal representative in Honduras that holds a power of attorney.

XIV.

Comply with the RO code.

XV.

Comply with the Organic Law of the Merchant Marine and its regulation of
inspection, recognition and issuance of certificates of maritime safety to ships
under the Honduran registry.

XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.

Logo of the company has to be presented
Dry seal of the company has to be presented.
To ensure the compliance and the responsibilities that emanate from the
delegation agreements, the sum of USD 20,000 has to be rendered as a bank
guarantee.

XIX.

The people responsible for the evaluation and protection plans shall have a
course of maritime protection approved.

the maritime administrations recently reported a great need to upgrade the
requirements since some cases of fraud and forgery where reported ; new security
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procedures have to be put in place, to keep up with new illegal trends to avoid them at
any cost.
It is clear that the RO Code has its advantages, but is it enough? No, the RO code states
some responsibilities for the ROs, but it is within the delegation agreement that the
real responsibilities of both parties are clearly stated, once again, this is not a panacea,
the content may vary from one country to another.
It was on 9th October 1995 through the MSC/Circ.710, MEPC/ Circ. 307, IMO
released the Model Agreement for The Authorization of Recognized Organizations
Acting on Behalf of the Administration.
Later on, it was through the Sub-Committee On Implementation Of IMO Instruments
On its third session, agenda item 13 on 10th May 2016 that it was decided that there
was a need for a new Model Agreement for The Authorization of Recognized
Organizations Acting on Behalf of the Administration.
 Primarily, the fact that the Model Agreement for The Authorization of
Recognized Organizations Acting on Behalf of the Administration had been
around for 21 years and many things had changed in the maritime world;
 The entrance into force of the RO code with a mandatory status for the IMO
member states;
 Correspondingly, there was not a Model Agreement for The Authorization of
Recognized Organizations Acting on Behalf of the Administration within the
RO code;
 Also, since there was an apparent inconsistency between the RO code as a new
instrument and the 1995 Model Agreement;
 There was an imperative need to take in consideration the III code (Resolution
A.1070(28))
 It was also essential to take into consideration that there have to be
requirements being explicitly stated for training and certification of the
technical staff of the recognized organization.
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So finally, after the VIMSAS report was presented, there were a series of
inconsistencies between the maritime administration and the recognized organization's
contractual responsibilities that were found.

Therefore it is expected that this agreement will contain all the points that need to be
amended and also there should be clauses that would put more security in the action
of both parties, the administration, and the RO.

2.5 Efficiency of the delegation contract
As it was mention in the previous subtitles, it was on 9th October 1995 through the
MSC/Circ.710, MEPC/ Circ. 307 that IMO released the Model Agreement for The
Authorization of Recognized Organizations Acting on Behalf of the Administration,

Until now, this has not been updated, administrations, as well as the ROs, have been
using the same format. (See Annex I for Honduras National Delegation Contract
sample)

The RO code section 8, numeral 8.2 under Legal basis of the functions under the
authorization, one of the requirements that the flag state is obliged to have is a formal
written agreement with the RO, with in the same Resolution MSC. 349(92) within
appendix 3 the smallest elements of the delegation agreement are given.
 Application
 Purpose
 General conditions
 The execution of functions under authorization
 Legal basis of the functions under authorization
 Reporting the flag
 Development of rules and regulations- information
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 Other conditions
 Specification of the authorization from the flag state to the organization.
 The flag state´s supervision of duties delegated to the organization.

As said before minimum requirements and have to be fulfilled in order for the RO to
carry on with the statutory functions on behalf of a State, the most important
consideration by the author is the last one, regarding the monitoring procedures which
will cover later in chapter 3 in a particular way.

However, the aspect of analyzing as to whether the agreement complies with the
guidelines given by the IMO instruments, the delegation of flag State to the ROs, as
well if this is enough to make sure there is a proper enforcement tool, can be found in
annex 3 of the RO code.

Is it enough to have the merest outline of the requirements of the Delegation
Agreement between the RO and the flag stated mention in the RO code?
The answer is no; as mention by professor Mukherjee, there is no updated IMO Model
Agreement so far, this takes us to the use of an outdated delegation agreement that
lacks uniformity at an international level, that might eventually encounter difficulties
for those who take part in it. (Mukherjee P, 2002)

To accurately describe de delegation agreement that is being used as a legal binding
document up to date; Proshanto K. Mukherjee uses the word “patchwork quilt” to
describe the lack of uniformity within the international maritime law, the author totally
agrees with that, since there is no uniformity, not only in the law but in the sanctions
regarding the breach of it. (Mukherjee P., 2002)

It has been over the years that many flag states throughout their maritime
administrations have undertaken the signing and transfer of the delegation agreements
in total lack of a national regime.
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The perfect example is the case of Honduras; there is a lack of legal instruments to
control and enforce the ROs that are delegated by the country, a situation that has to
change and should be given the attention that it deserves regarding this matter.

Additionally,

delegation agreements may contain clauses regarding duties and

responsibilities; the ultimate liability will always fall upon the state, suitable for task
carried out by the member state with the purpose of liability and defense, thus, the high
possibility for the RO to be subject of state immunity.

2.6 Institutional challenges of the state of Honduras in the regulatory scope as
well as in the supervision of the ROs.
IMO through the RO code, has established in part 3 numeral 5 UNDER
ESTABLISHING AN OVERSIGHT PROGRAM, the measures the flag state shall
undergo in order to provide proper supervision of the ROs as well as to make sure
there is full compliance with the international obligations.

For this topic, the author will proceed to take an overlook at recommendations of the
RO code as well as civil procedures in the case of Honduras.

For the flag state to accurately ensure the quality of the performance of the recognized
organizations that it has under its delegation, it has to establish within its national law
a range of procedures to do so, and this will give a proper oversight and monitoring.

In the case of Honduras in its Organic Law of the Merchant Marine which is the only
source of maritime law in its regulation of inspection, recognition and issuance of
certificates of maritime safety of Honduran registry, in its 8article 23, item B states

8

Ley Orgánica de la Marina Mercante Nacional, Articulo 23, b) La entidad autorizada estará sujeta a la auditoría y calificación

de sus sistemas de calidad por un cuerpo independiente de auditores nombrados por la administración Marítima Hondureña.
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that the authorized entity will be subject to audits and rating of its quality system,
through an independent body of auditors that will be appointed by the Honduras
Maritime Administration.

It is evident the lack of enough instruments to ensure a strict overview of the ROs and
is this the primary reason why in some cases the actions of the ROs cannot be
supervised and may illegal action can take place without the administration´s
knowledge.

The RO Code, states that it is required to have supplementary surveys to ensure
compliance with the international Instruments, in the same manner, it also requires
supplementary surveys to guaranty that the vessels which will be navigating under any
flag complies with the national requirements, this with the objective of carrying out
the proper oversight of the ROs. (IMO, 2013)

At this point, it can be an adventure to say that in most cases the regulation and
supervision are the Achille´s heel of most maritime administrations as it is the case
Honduras;

The first requirement for a proper oversight of the ROs, is requiring having personnel
for the supplementary survey that should have the technical knowledge regarding the
rules and regulations of the flag state and the ROs.

Having in place procedures to monitor the surveyor's activity is essential, but they are
not always carried out by the member states, having processes in place to ensure that
the work of the surveyors has been carried out adequately and moreover in compliance
with the national processes.

31

It is of great importance to know how the surveyors act on behalf of the RO from an
independent oversight and not only by the information provided by the RO.

Many maritime administrations do not have qualified personnel to assume supervision;
therefore, ORs will go for the time of the validity of the contract without proper
supervision; being this one of the most common and most dangerous issues
surrounding the delegation of authority to ROs.

There are two keys aspects that all maritime administrations have to have and, are
recommended by the international conventions and guidelines, and that is:
-

Firstly, to have strong national laws that will instruct the supervision and
regulation of the ROs acting on behalf of the state, these have to foreshadow
as many situations that can arise from the performance of the delegation
agreement;

-

Secondly, to have all means necessary to exercise control over ROs, nationally
and internationally, having control over the performance of ROs is critical, if
this is not done, many aspects of security and safety can be eluded and might
result in incidents or accidents to ships flying the state´s flag.

2.7 The impact in the safety of navigation
To ensure that the ships are safe enough throughout their operational lifetime, the ship
to go through periodical inspections, which is done by the recognized organization to
re-confirm their owners as well as the client who make use of it, that the vessel is in a
good seaworthiness condition;

Even though the topic of seaworthiness can be a topic to be discuss by itself, for this
dissertation, the author will acknowledge that it is responsible in the first instance of
the shipowner, the RO and finally the administration.
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Consequently, from safety of navigation point of view, the ROs play an essential role,
the survey and certificate is a vital piece of information about a ship's condition at a
specific time, therefore, the work that the ROs undertakes is a vital part of the maritime
safety and security.

The author will venture to say that cargo owners in an indirect way can and do put
their trust in the evidence presented that most of the vessels are in compliance with the
requirements for a seaworthy vessel according to their shipowner and the certificates
displayed.

When it comes to safety, there is a reservation made by some of the recognized
organizations, and that is that the technical certificates issued by the ROs according to
them do not constitute a warranty of safety, fitness or seaworthiness of the ships.
(IACS, 2012)

The statements above can be ample discussed, since ROs have exercised statutory
authority on behalf of the flag States in order to comply with provision given by IMO
instruments, which have as the primary purpose to safeguarding safety and security
of the maritime trade, then can it be plainly state that is an element of responsibility
since that's the final purpose of exercising the delegation based on the instruments
regarding the safety and security.

The document issued to a vessel, to give an example of a Load Line Certificate, which
is a requirement under FAL.2/Circ.131, MEPC.1/Circ.873, MSC.1/Circ.1586 and
LEG.2/Circ.3, which has the purpose of ensuring that a ship has sufficient freeboard
and therefore sufficient reserve buoyancy. It should also ensure adequate stability and
avoid excessive stress on the ship's hull as a result of overloading. (Gard, 2013)
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All of which have the ultimate purpose of keeping the ship safe and secure, in the case
of omitting this requirement there would be a latent danger for the vessel, the
environment, and the lives on board since the ship might not even have the minimum
safety requirements.

The importance of documents and accuracy of them cannot be disregard from a safety
point of view, the impact on safety of a ship with a LL 66 Certificate that do not
comply with the requirements of LL 1966, article 16; LL PROT 1988, article 16 could
end in grave consequences,

Therefore, the importance of the proper surveys and inspections, for the issuance of
the documents, the issue should not be taken lightly when it comes as the role that
ROs play in the safety and security of vessels these actions prove that, there is a
responsibility of safety upon the ROs.

In the case study that will be presented in chapter 3 will the author will show, how
lightly the issuance of a certificate can be taken, and the possibly dangerous effects of
damage that this can lead to a breach of the safety of navigation and the life at sea.

Therefore to assume that the technical certificates and the documents issued by ROs
are not directly associated with the safety and security of cargo as well as life will be
a fallacy that needs to be exposed and be taken more seriously.

In the gradual development of the topic, the author will touch on the adverse effects of
forged information of documents, be it a technical certificate or document, the effects
that can have on the safety and security of ships, their cargos and the lives of the crew
onboard.
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2.8 Implementation and development of the International Guidelines.
As is was indicated before the Recognized Organization Code (RO Code) was adopted
by IMO by Resolution MSC 349(92) and MEPC 237 (65)

It is appropriate at this point to clarify the scope of the RO code in order to proceed a
little more in-depth on the topic, the scope of application can be found in the RO code
itself and therefore:
“ The Code applies to:
all organizations being considered for recognition or that are recognized by a flag
State to perform, on its behalf, statutory certification and services under mandatory
IMO instruments and national legislation; and

all flag States that intend to recognize an organization to perform, on their behalf,
statutory certification and services under mandatory IMO instruments."
(IMO, 2013)

Having this in mind, and all the information regarding the legal responsibilities these
entities acquire once there is a delegation agreement between the state and the RO, it
makes more sense to understand why IMO had to develop an instrument to regulate
their performance, furthermore taking in consideration that the administration will
remain fully responsible of the actions of the RO when this is done under delegation
of the administration.

The author will proceed to show the structure of the RO Code from a superficial but
consistent way, and eventually, this will help us to understand more the legal gaps that
exist in the application of it at some level in the maritime administrations:
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RO Code, Part 1 GENERAL, item 4 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY:
4.1 A flag State may delegate authority to an organization recognized as complying
with the provisions of this Code to perform, on its behalf, statutory certification and
services under mandatory IMO instruments and its national legislation.

The delegation authorization is given but not the application or procedure to do so and
to make sure there are strictly comply with it.

RO Code, Part 2 RECOGNITION AND AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENTS
FOR ORGANIZATIONS, item 8 AUTHORIZATION OF RECOGNIZED
ORGANIZATIONS: 8.1 Under the provisions of regulation I/6 of SOLAS 1974,
article 13 of LL 66, regulation 6 of MARPOL Annex I and regulation 8 of MARPOL
Annex II and Article 6 of TONNAGE 69.

A flag State may authorize an RO to act on its behalf in statutory certification and
services and determination of tonnages only to ships entitled to fly its flag as required
by these conventions. Such authorizations shall not require ROs to perform actions
that impinge on the rights of another flag State.

The main supervisions regarding to the security and safety of the navigations and life
at sea are or can be delegated to ROs, and such issue should have a more strict
requirements than the ones stated on the RO code;

The author believes that because of the importance of the security and safety matter
regarding these certifications based on these maritime conventions, there is the need
for a more strict supervision upon the private organizations authorized to issue the
certifications.

RO Code, Part 3 OVERSIGHT OF RECOGNIZED ORGANIZATIONS, item 6
PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING: 6.1 The flag State should be satisfied that the RO has
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an effective quality management system in place. The flag State may rely upon the
audits carried out by an accredited certification body or equivalent organizations.

In reality, the maritime administrations are the ones who undertake the audits; in many
cases people of the maritime administration that might not even have the technical
people to undertake the audits and this is done only to comply in the short term.

All of the above, to be functional, have to be implemented in the national framework
of each member state, and this will vary from state to state, as is stated by Francesco
Berliengieri, a distinction has to be made between the states that have adopted the
monist approach, in which case the conventions are executed automatically and ad the
same time obtain a national effect, Berliengieri, also mentions that as is the case on
most of the states that have a dualistic approach require an explicit national law in
order to be able to implement the conventions that have been adopted by the state.
(Berlingieri F., 2013)

In the case of Honduras the implementation was done in a proper legal way, but the
enforcement of it still a milestone for the country, since there are so many requirements
to be developed, and at the same time so little human and economic resources to do
so, therefore the danger of illegal acts on behalf of some ROs tend to increase.

Conclusion:
It can be concluded from this chapter´s information that even though there are
contractual responsibilities stated in the delegation agreement, that are to be complied
with by the recognized organizations in some cases these are not thoroughly followed,
there are also contractual responsibilities that the apart from the stated the ROs have
to follow these are with the shipowners, and as it will be seen later this might be breach
by both parties, nevertheless the responsibilities before third parties will always have
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an element that will always belong to the shipowner and that is the inalienable as is
the seaworthiness.

the author firmly believe the liability of these organizations has been taken slightly,
and there is a strong need to make some changes at international levels;

In the first instance, in order for it to be automatically transcribed to the national law
of the countries as a mandatory prescription, and only then could be a more strict
control on the performance of many ROs that do not fall into the IACS supervision
circle.
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3. Case studies of fraud and forgery in Honduras.
Introduction
It at this point, it is appropriate to begin stating that the intentions of the author are by
no means to elaborate a profound comparative analysis of the situations and legal cases
along this research as well as the possible legal solutions that could come out, but more
to be a window to view some cases that at this stage in time, are not considered with
the seriousness of the case;

Fraud and forgery of certificates can have a tremendous and severe impact on the
maritime trade, as it will be showed during the progress of the chapter.

3.1 Fraud and forgery of technical certificates of ships.
For starters, the definition of fraud and forgery and how these figures work separately
or together has to be given, and how these two play a negative role in the maritime
industry, the definitions will be given first.

Many authors have remitted to Black´s Law Dictionary when defining the fraud and
forgery, and in this case, the author will also use this source since it is the most
assertive definition for this research.

According to Black´s Law Dictionary fraud;

“ a knowing misinterpretation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce
another to act to his or her detriment."
(LAW DICTIONARY BLACK'S, 1979)
In the case of the forgery, the definition is as follows,
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“ (a) alters any writing of another without his authority; or (b) makes, completes,
executes, authenticates, issues or transfers any writing so that it purports to be the act
of another who did not authorize that act, or to have been executed at a time or place
or in a numbered sequence other, then was, in fact, the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed; or (c) utters any writing which he knows to be
forged in a manner specified in paragraph"
(LAW DICTIONARY BLACK'S, 1979)

Another Definition of forgery that by its simplicity the author would like to refer is the
one given by Lemert, Edwin M, where he defines forgery in a common law approach
saying it is the false signing of a legal document that creates liability, moreover, it will
be hold even when the complete legal document is false and only provides an apparent
legality. (Lemert. E., 1953)

Having these two definitions in consonance make it suitable to proceed with the
development of the chapter, in a more specialized manner, as well as for the
presentation of 3 Honduras’s cases of forgery and fraud.

It has been indicated before that the ROs do play an essential role in what is the
maritime security and safety, but there are other stakeholders that also provide
elements of safety and security, the shipowners, the shipbuilders, the flag states, the
port state control, the underwriters, marine financiers, charterers and among others
actors that have duties with the maritime industry. (Clyne & Saville, 2007)

In 2014 Professor Henning Jessen in his article for the CMI YEARBOOK 2014
regarding The Liability of Class Societies, has stated that there was for that time an
estimated number of more than 100 private organizations that offered the services of
survey, inspection and certification, in the same article he raises two issues that I
considered of great importance, first the end to a long-time monopoly of the exclusive
class societies meaning IACS, and the increase in competition for this maritime market
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regarding the surveying and certification that has now bring a high competition.
(Jessen, 2014)

It is the opinion of the author, that this increase of competition, many serious issues
have surfaced, the lack of a system of supervision of the quality of performance of the
ROs for example, in contrast with the IACS who have to undergo a quality
performance inspection every 2 years, which is done by the European Union though is
legislation in its Regulation (EC) No 391/2009 and Directive 2009/15/EC.

This inspections englobe the inspection of the head offices as well as the regional ones,
including the inspection of the ships with the sole purpose to ensure that the
performance of the recognized organizations that belong to IACS comply with the
highest given standards, this inspections can be carried out by the request of the state's
members of the European Union. (European Maritime Safety Agency, 2019)

But what happens to the rest of the organizations that are offering the same services?,
who is supervising from close?, The answer of that can be found in the article 94 of
the UNCLOS 82, under Duties of the flag state “1. Every State shall effectively exercise
its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships
flying its flag.” (Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982).

UNCLOS, give us the utopian answer, as it is supposed to be the member state, but as
it has been mention throughout this work, this is not what happens in practice, many
member states do not implement a proper supervision or enforcement and there is no
type of system to prevent illegal action by the ROs, not because they do not want but
in many cases because they cannot do so.

It has been observed, that due to the increase of the maritime market of class societies
or in this case ROs, the standards have lower their standards to keep up with
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competition, and attract more clients who engage into “class hopping” (Hosanee,
2009), and here is where the problems arise.

Since many flag states have not developed a proper oversight of their ROs these issues
might go undetected and the ship will be registered under its flag, posing a latent
danger for the navigation, the human life and the environment;

This will be categorized under the definition of the Black's Law dictionary as an
evidence of fraud, since the real information is being concealed, as well as can be the
case that a substandard ship will be registered under the flag of a country, and there
won't be any knowledge of this as it will be seen under the cases of "Phantom Ships"
later on this chapter.
When referring to maritime certificates fraud, it has to be taken in consideration the
ROs that are not delegated by the states and proceed to act in the name of them by
registering ships under their flag, this is a growing issued that has already since 2015
has been taken as an essential matter to be deal with by the member states of IMO.
The forgery in the other hand has been more latent in the agenda of IMO from a
certificates of competency point of view, this does not mean that the forgery and fraud
do not go together in this specific case, in fact they do;
IMO has issued many guidelines for the administrations to be implemented to deal
with this and in many countries it has succeeded, but when it comes to the ship
certificates IMO has not attacked the issue as it should have.
Moreover, in the year 2001, The Maritime Safety Committee in its 74th session, issued
a 34-page Research study on fraudulent practices associated with certificates of
competency and endorsements, the enhancement of the STCW was proposed;
interesting enough, is that in the same report was mention that the administrations and
industry reported a high prevalence of fraudulent practices in ship's certificates and
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expressed at that time the need to take action over this issue about this issue nothing
was done. (IMO, MSC 74/6/2, 2001)

3.2 Fraudulent practices associated with phantom ships.
There are many practices that will have; as a result of fraudulent certificates, therefore
it is appropriate to raise a somehow trending issue, but not a new one, by that it is
inferred that the fraudulent registration of ship "Phantom Ships"; are highly related to
the fraud and forgery of technical certificates, since the consequences will be the same,
a latent risk for the safety and security of the maritime trade.

IMO has followed this issue from a very subtle manner, after reporting to IMO
Secretariat of some member states whose flag was being used without any
authorization, as in the case of The Democratic Republic of the Congo, who informed
IMO about 73 vessels that were not registered within their maritime administration
and where flying their flag; IMO release such information through Circular Letter
No.3717 on the 23 March 2017, along with the list of the ships with their IMO
numbers.

The above was not an isolated case at IMO during that year, in the same manner the
following countries reported similar incidents in different years, but for reference, it
has been used the last two years as shown in table 1 and 2 below:
Year 2017
Member State

IMO Circular Letter No.

No. of vessels/info.

Republic of Vanuatu

3734

Democratic Republic of

3717

Illegal Vanuatu
international ship
registry
73

3798

91

Congo
Republic of Fiji

Table 1Reports received in 2017 by IMO regarding the fraudulent registration under their flag
Source: Authors IMO, LEG 106/7, 2019
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Year 2018
Member State

IMO Circular letter No.

No. of vessels/info.

Republic of Maldives

3840

3

United Republic of

3876

11

3855

Illegal use of country

Tanzania
The Republic of Nauru

name
Independent State of Samoa

3866

Revoke of delegation
Agreement with RO

Independent State of Samoa

3854

18

Table 2 Reports received in 2018 by IMO regarding the fraudulent registration under their flag
Source: IMO, LEG 106/7, 2019

Micronesia, was one of the cases that in 2016 reported to IMO the incredible number
of 150 vessels registered without any authorization, additionally IMO was also a
victim of the fraud since it was drawn to open an administrator account with a
username and password, in the name of Micronesia;

Later on, it was found that the documents presented for that purpose where forged,
luckily IMO soon enough realized the fraud and cancel the accesses; nevertheless 150
vessels had been already registered. (LEG 106/7, 2019)

Therefore, in a total there has been the information of 345 fraudulent ship registrations
between the years of 2016 and 2018, an alarming number; the effects that this ship can
have on international trade is a severe issue.

In order for us to understand the importance of this "Phantom Ship" issue with our
current topic, it is essential to understand the following logic behind it, which is shown
in the diagram below:
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* Illigal Trade
* Lack of security and
safety
* Risk to the marine
enviroment.
*Fraud/Forgery of Tech
Certificates.
* Forged Registration
Doc.
* Fictisious Crew
Names.
* Illigal Registry
* Delegated RO
* Fraudulent RO

Phantom Ship
pruduc of:
* Illegal actions of
delegated ROs
* Paricy
* Sub standard ship
* Victim froud
Table 3 The Chain Effect of phantom ships
Source: Authors´ analysis of the information given by IMO though the Circular letters.

As it represented above in table 3, there are many actors involved in the fraudulent
ship registration, as mention before it is one of the issues that involves the forgery and
fraud of technical certificates in the role of ROs but is one segment of it;

There is no real sign that this problem will go away soon enough, even though the
International Maritime Organization has in the committee’s 2018–19 biennial agenda,
agreed to eradicate this issue with a target completion year of 2021. (IMO, LEG
105/11, 2018)
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The phantom ship problem has to be taken as a serious matter since it jeopardized the
security and safety, there is a significant amount of vessels many of which have not
been identified yet sailing in international waters and arriving to ports all over the
world, holding technical certificates as well as other documents that look legitimate,
in many cases there is no procedure in place for the verification on those certificates;
therefore the Port State Control Inspector will release the vessel with any further
setback.

Even though, this is an big concern for IMO, since the fraudulent registration of ships
will pose an impediment for the member states to properly implement the international
instruments,

Also, is a very serious issue from the maritime security point of view; many of these
vessels are used to undertake transportation of narcotics, stolen goods, and even
smuggling weapons; therefore the problem has to be targeted for those reasons and
many more that will be touch upon later. (Ellerman B. A., 2011)

Since there is no real effective control over these vessels, besides the known illegal
and document irregularities, there may be many other illegal activities that are taking
place on board, that could be maintaining substandard conditions on the ship, that in
the short term can also endanger the lives of the crew onboard. (Gallagher J., 2018)

3.2.1 Fraudulent process of certification to ships
It has been mention already that some of those elements play a significant role in the
whole framework of fraud and falsification of certificates, as well as documents in the
fraudulent registration of ships,

It is now appropriate to give a closer look at some specific cases, for these the author
will present some real cases;
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However, before there has to be acknowledged what was mention, regarding the
proliferation of organizations that provide the service of certification, and surveying
as well in some cases of registration under the delegation of many states;

The proliferation is one of the main reasons why the problem of forgery and fraud still
an issue in the maritime industry.

The outstanding matter that contribute to fraud and forgery of certificates, the most
common one is the loathing to the change; by that it is meant that there still old
practices that for many circumstances the maritime authorities still clenching to them
as it is the use of paper documents.

Realizing that up to this point in time where the world has headed very rapidly to an
electronic era, interesting enough is that the maritime industry still hanging to the
paper era;

Moreover, this is the reason why up to know the fraud and forgery can still happen and
in many cases, with very damaging consequences for the trade. (Kapoor P., 1987)

The author agrees with Kapoor with the statement above regarding the procedures that
are maintained in the maritime industry and is the usage of document paper as proofs,
that can give a breach of security up to now.

Is not strange to find out that every time the topic of fraud and forgery in the maritime
trade comes, the first thing that comes to mind is the commercial maritime documents,
or for that matter, fraudulent practices associated with certificates of competency and
endorsements;
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Issues that have been the target of many academic research as well as matters of
investigation by national and international entities, as is the case of the International
Maritime Organization (UNCTAD, 1983)
" The RO shall perform statutory certification and services by the use of only exclusive
surveyors and auditors, being persons solely employed by the RO, duly qualified,
trained and authorized to execute all duties and activities incumbent upon their
employer, within their level of work responsibility." (IMO, MSC.349(92), 2013)

The keywords that to be concern with are: duly qualified, trained and authorized;
issues that play a role in the fraud and forgery at some point, it will be seen more in
practice when the study cases of fraud and forgery are introduced, relating Honduras
Administration.

It was already mention before as it is shown in table 3, that the ships that are subject
of fraud and forgery when it comes to their technical certificates or documents of
registry are the ships that have been subject of piracy, substandard ships and as well
victims of fraud who are not aware unscrupulous organizations are deceiving them.

3.2.2

Study cases of fraud, forgery by Honduran ROs

A) Detention By PSC Of A Ship with fraudulent certificates onboard.
Problem:

The following cases A, B and C took place in Honduras, Central American; the name
of the ship or its IMO number or the name of the RO involved, will not be disclosed
for privacy issues.
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On the 12 of July of 2013 a report of the detention of an international ship flying the
flag of Honduras was received in its maritime safety department;

The detention took place in the Braila, Romania (PSCO #8) according to the
international procedures, the de information of the detention were accompanied by the
documents presented by the master of the ship to the PSCO,

The documents the ship had on board at the moment of the detention were revised, as
the procedure of the maritime safety department requires.
It was concluded in the technical opinion SM-258/2013 that:

Regarding the Minimum Safe Manning Certificate that the ship had on board the
maritime administration concluded that the certificate was forged given the following:
1. The serial number of the certificate did not belong to the maritime safety
department.
2. The date of issuance did not correspond to the serial number that was issued
on that date.
3. The signature of authorization on the certificate did not corresponded to the
Honduras General Director at that moment.
Therefore it was stated by the Maritime Safety Department that this certificate was
forged.

Regarding the Registration Certificate presented by the master of the onboard to the
PSCO, the maritime administration of Honduras concluded that:

1. The registration certificate had been expired for more than two years since it
was expired on the 22 of September of 2010.
2. The maritime administration does not authorize the issuance of technical
certificates to ships whose registration certificate is expired.

49

3. The vessel was reported in the maritime administration records to be inactive;
nevertheless, the vessel was navigating at the moment of the detention.
Regarding the issuance of the rest of the certificates, these were regarded as forged.

The condition of the forged documents onboard was reported to the PSC where the
ship was at that moment detained; nevertheless, the ship was released on the ground
of exemption letters issued by the RO, amazingly enough, was that the RO was never
authorized to issue those exemption letters, this was done in an apparent contravention
of SOLAS chapter I, regulation 4.

Later on, maritime administration of Honduras, under which the ship was supposedly
register contacted the shipowner who informed, he had made all the arrangements with
a representative of the maritime administration in Syria, information was exchanged
via email,

As part of the procedures information of the contacts were requested as well as the
information that could be of any help to proceed legally.

As it is part of the procedure in these cases, the problem was reported to the Viña del
Mar memorandum of understanding as well as other MoUs, stating that the vessel shall
proceed to be detained at any port since the vessel was carrying fraudulent certificates,

In the same manner, the information of the illegal action of the RO was informed to
IMO.

It was later informed that the surveyor of the OR in question, had been forgedly
representing the flag state for the periods 2011 and 2012 as well as making federal tax
charges and issuing technical certificates, and the endorsement of documents which
only the maritime administration has authorization to do.
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Impressively enough, the RO was only fined with $5,000.00, and there was no legal
action against the surveyor posing as a flag inspector; moreover, the RO was renewed
as to act a delegated recognized organization.

b) Case of Fraudulent Actions by Recognized Organization.

Problem:
On the 14 of August of 2018 the complaint and information department of the
Honduras Maritime Administration received a request from a shipowner of a vessel
placed in Singapore,

Who was requesting the verification of technical certificates issued by an RO that had
been delegated by the maritime administration some years back, and not in a continues
manner.

The documents that were presented were the following:


Confirmation of Registry;



Seaworthiness Certificate;



International Tonnage Certificate(1996);



Cargo Ship Safety Radio Certificate; and



Record of Equipment for the Cargo Ship Safety Radio Certificate(Form R)

The maritime safety departments preceded accordingly with the procedure stated for
verification of information, and in the national as well as the international registry did
not have any record of the ship in questions.

The documents were inspected, and the professional opinion concluded that:
1. There was no record of the ship in the database of the Honduras Maritime
Administration.
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2. The date of issuance of the technical certificates presented by the shipowner
was issued before there was a delegation agreement between the Honduras
Maritime Administration and the RO.
3. The RO was not delegated with authority at any time to issue a certificate of
registry, since that is an exclusive power of the Honduras Maritime Authority.
4. The delegation agreement was exclusively to act upon the ships that sail in
Honduras national waters or upon ships that made international voyages but
that their port of call was the national port.

After the verification of the certificates as well as the non-compliance of the RO with
the clauses of delegation agreement and the confirmation of the fraud on the issuance
of a certificate of registry, without the authorization of the format of the one the
maritime administration is entitled to issue;

The shipowner was contacted to verify the person of contact or for that matter the
surveyor representing the RO.

On the 19 August 2018, the shipowner forwarded information of surveyor as well as
business card, and it was a proven fact that signatures on the technical certificates as
well as name on the business card corresponded to authorized surveyor of the RO as
well as the owner of the RO.

It is being this the second case of fraud committed by the same RO in less than a year
since in 25 of April of 2018, it was also received by a request of verification of a
certificate of registry of a vessel that did not appear as registered by the Honduras
Administration or for that matter in the database.
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c) Case of Forgery of Document By RO.
Problem:
On November 14th of the year 2018, it was received the request of a ship to cancel,
this was done by the legal presentative of the shipowner in the country, to procedure
requires for the shipowner to provide the continuous synopsis record;

The Continuous synopsis record (CSR) is issued by the administration of the ship,
which would be flying its flag, the CSR was presented and the following observation
by the Maritime Safety department where made:
1. The CSR was not issued by the Maritime Safety Department, as it states;
2. There is no official copy of such CSR in the file of the ship that the maritime
administration has for that ship;
3. The CSR was issued in the format for application of it and not in the required
format;
4. The format presented as a CSR does not have the amendments like the form 2
and 3;
5. The logos in the documents did not correspond to those in the documents issued
by the administration;
6. The signatures in the documents did not correspond to the General Director of
the Merchant Marine as it should, as well as the stamps were not the ones that
the original documents have.

The Maritime Safety Department recommended the legal department to proceed with
investigations of issuance of such a document as well as it was not allowed for the
vessel to cancel its registration in that maritime administration.
In this same situation, two more ships requested the cancelation in the same month and
as well as the case presented above the documents of CSR where forged; therefore
their cancelation was stopped until further investigation was done.

53

The representative of the shipowner presented documentation regarding the source of
the documents presented and as well a letter of the shipowner stating that he had no
information that the company that issued the documents;

moreover, that the RO had no delegation agreement with the maritime authority as
well he presented the receipts paid to that company for the fraudulent documents, he
paid an alarming amount of $62,000.00 for the document of two ships.

Going more into the investigation it was discovered that the RO who had issued in
recent times fraudulent certificates ( cases mention above case B) was the same as the
enterprise that sells the services of documentation to the owner of the ships above
mentioned.

3.2.3

Resolution of the cases:

In the cases A, B, and C the Honduras Maritime Administration follow the internal
procedures stated for forgery and fraud of documents, these procedures being an
internal ones and lacking international legal steps, therefore just reaching upon to the
point of reporting to the memorandums of understandings and the International
Maritime Organization, and even though it is mentioned in the National Organic Law,
9

Article 23 this is not at any point, a safeguard that the fraud and the forgery will not

take place.

One of the most critical issues that Honduras as an IMO member state has is the matter
of not having in place a procedure that involves the judicial system for the
investigation from a criminal point of view, in the case of fraud and forgery as well as
official documents, committed by international companies, therefore the reporting of
the cases to the international bodies as IMO and MoUs would not be enough to stop

9

Ibid., No. 5, P. 34
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these illegal actions, there has to be an international investing with the international
investigation bodies and there has to be a court judgment followed by a penal sanction
in order for this issue to be stopped.

3.3 The authenticity and integrity of the certificates.
For this subtitle, the author will be refereeing to the case studies, since those are the
most tangible examples, we will also be referencing to the MSC 74/6/2 Research study
on fraudulent practices associated with certificates of competency and endorsements,
since it will be used as a comparative, this because there is not enough public
information on the example of forge technical certificates available; not because there
are no cases but because the maritime administrations have not collaborated by given
this information as it is already mentioned in the methodology section.

We shall start by defined certificates to proceed with the flow of ideas.
IMO has defined certificates within one of the Circulars that will be the one will be
using;

"Certificate means a document issued by an Administration that is used to show
compliance with IMO requirements. The term "certificate" does not include
publications, manuals, instructions, or ships' logs used to record ongoing operations;"
(IMO, FAL.5/Circ.39, 2013)

The above premise, it is essential to remark that this responsibility of the issuance of
certificates in compliance with the IMO conventions can and is delegated to
recognized organizations as it was mention in the preceding chapters.

It has been stated by the relevant Convention the format that all technical certificates
shall follow, but it is the Member State the one that give the final instruction for the
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format, and is by that approval that the ROs will issue in the name of the
administration.

When there is an intention to obtains the relevant technical certificates by and RO, one
of the requirements will be the registration certificate; those certification procedures
can also be delegated as well, as other technical certifications, being this the genesis
of many fraud and forgery issues.

It is important to remember that once the RO is authorized to issue the technical
certificates or whatever document it was authorized to be issued by the
maritime administration, the format and the security paper will be at a free
disposition of the personnel working for that private entity, therefore the
importance of delegating to an RO that is renown with international prestige
and honorability as the Honduran Government requires it;
However, is this enough? After looking at the study cases, it can be assumed
in a premature manner that is not.

Now the fraud and forgery will be shown from a practical point of view,
exposed with documents;

In the case of the Case Study A), this is the first document that was detected as
fraudulent:
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A. Fraudulent safe manning document

1.The serial
number do
not
correspond
to the ship

Figure 1 SMD object of forgery by a delegated RO.
Source: Document provided by the Maritime Safety Department of the General Directorate of the Merchant Marine,
Honduras,2018.
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In the case study A) referred in to the document above, it can be identify clearly
the inconsistencies of forgery as it is define in the Black’s Law Dictionary10,
clearly as numbered from 1to 3 in the specimen above;
This document was given to the shipowner by an authorized RO, that had a
delegation agreement, but that was not authorized to issue this Minimum Safe
Manning Document, since is the duty of the Maritime Administration only,
down below the original document is presented in order for the reader to have
a broad idea of the inconsistencies found in the case study A);

10

Black´s Law Dictionary; Forgery; (a) alters any writing of another without his authority; or (b) makes, completes, executes,

authenticates, issues or transfers any writing so that it purports to be the act of another who did not authorize that act, or to have
been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other , than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when
no such original existed;
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B. Legal same manning document issued by DGMM

Figure 2 Original certificate issued by DGMM of Honduras,2019
Source: Document provided by the Maritime Safety Department of the General Directorate of the Merchant Marine,
Hondura,2018. .

The original document presented in figure 2, has many security elements, it has
a bar code, for easy identification;
As well as two serial numbers the one related to the ship itself and one
analogous to the security paper used for the issuance of the certificate; Reasons
for which it was an easy task to detect the forged document.
It was due to the appropriate timing of the detention by the PSC, to the ship
that the administration had a hold of such forged document, and here is where
it can be seen that the issue might escalate into a safety issue;
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If the ship would not have been detained most likely it would have continue
sailing with a forged documents of which there is no way for any PSC to be
able to identify.
Continuing with the examples in practice the author would like to show how
far a fraud of documents can go in the role of ROs, that have been delegated
by Maritime Administrations but that act outside the remit of the delegation
agreement.
The following documents are the ones referred to in the case study B);
As the author stated it in the case study b), only the accredited entity to issue
the certificate of registration is the Maritime Authority of Honduras,
nevertheless an RO can be delegated to it, and it is the case of two entities that
have been delegated to it, but in the case of figure 3, the RO was not delegated
for it.
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C. Fraudulent certificate of registry

Figure 3 Fraudulent Certificate of Registration, in detriment of Honduras flag.
Source: Maritime Safety Department of Honduras, 2018
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For the reader to do the proper comparison of documents down below it has
been included a real documents format issued by the Maritime Administration.

D. Legal Certificate of Registry

Figure 4 Authorized Certificate of Registration, by the Honduras Maritime Authority
Source: Maritime Safety Department of DGMM Honduras.
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In the case study B), one of the documents that was issued was a fraudulent
certificate of registration, as explained by the author before the RO, was not
delegated to do so,
The following document have a condition of fraudulence since the ship was in
international ship to which the RO wan no delegated to issue certificates to,
only ships that sail in national waters or that their home port was Honduras,
the proper clarification has to be made that the following documents belong to
the same ships whose certificate of registration was fraudulent.

The documents showed below are as follows;
1. Fraudulent Seaworthiness Certificate
2. Fraudulent International Tonnage Certificate
3. Fraudulent Cargo Ship Safety Radio Certificate
4. Fraudulent Cargo Ship Safety Radio Certificate Form R

It is important to take in consideration that the fraudulent certificates mention
above and shown below can have an element of safety that if breach can have
serious repercussions on the marine environment and the life at sea,
It is unknown how many years that vessel had been sailing under those
fraudulent certificates but one thing is sure;
It was by initiative of the ship owner to contact the Honduras Administration
to be able to verify those documents, if it was not because his enquiring that
vessel would have continue being a latent marine hazard, since the conditions
are not reliable.
As it is mention by the author in many occasions, the fact that a RO is delegated
by a maritime Administration does not guarantee that the actions of this private
entity will go accordingly to the delegation agreement if there is not a close
supervision and control over the actions of this entities.
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E. Fraudulent Seaworthiness Certificate

Figure 5 Fraudulent Certificate of Seaworthiness issued by an RO,
Source: Maritime Safety Department of DGMM of Honduras.
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F. Fraudulent International Tonnage Certificate

Figure 6 Fraudulent International Tonnage Certificate
Source: Maritime Safety Department of DGMM of Honduras, 2019
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G. Fraudulent Cargo Ship Safety Radio Certificate

Figure 7 Fraudulent Cargo Ship Safety Radio Certificate issued by an RO
Source: Maritime Safety Department of DGMM of Honduras.
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H. Fraudulent Cargo Ship Safety Radio Certificate Form R

Figure 8 Fraudulent Cargo Safety Radio Certificate Form R, issued by a RO.
Source: Maritime Safety Department of the DGMM of Honduras, 2018.

67

Recapping the fact that all documents showed above where issued by an RO,
that had a delegation agreement but was not authorized for the issuance of such
documents,
The author will present the last document object of fraud, and this is mention
in the case study C), reiterating the importance of a good and strict supervision
of the ROs.
I. Fraudulent CSR

Figure 9 Forge CSR issued by an RO.
Source: Maritime Safety Department of DGMM of Honduras.
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The CSR document, shown above, was issued on a CSR request format and it
was given to the ship owner as a real document, it is assumed that the owner
until today did not had any idea the document was not real.

3.4 Prevention of Fraud and Forgery.
There are many ways that forgery and fraud can be prevented, and if it is true that the
flag state has a significant role when it comes to revising and supervising the actions
of the ROs, that are being delegated, there is a need of a more strict supervision, the
vertical contractual audits (VCA)11 as is prescribed by the RO code, might not be
enough since with these audits there is no way to determines the actions that the RO
are assuming outside the delegation contract if any.

It is by PSC that 2many certificate that are not legal can be detected, unless the physical
certificate is the only proof of compliance, as it is stated by UNCLOS12, nevertheless
it is by the procedures that each maritime administration should have in place within
the national legislation procedures that could be as helpful for the prevention of fraud
and forgery but not only at a national or regional level but an international level this
can be done by creating an integrated PSC system.

Developing a worldwide system to which all PSC as well as administrations can be
connected and be able to share information, the author will strongly disagree on the
fact that e-certificates have been seen as a solutions for fraud and forgery, it can be to
a certain level a solution for the forgery of documents that won´t stop ORs to issue

11

A Vertical Contract Audit (VCA) is a contract/order specific audit of production processes, including
witnessing work during attendance at a survey, audit or plan approval in progress and, as applicable,
including relevant sub-processes. A VCA is carried out at a location or a site (Survey Station/Approval
Office/Site) to verify the correct application of relevant requirements in service realization for the specific
work in that contract/order, and their interactions. Source: https://puc.overheid.nl/nsi/doc/PUC_2327_14/
12 Ibid., PG 75
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certificates or documents to which they are not authorized as shown in the examples
before.

3.5 Sanctions for the Proven Cases of Fraud and Forgery.
As it was mention in chapter 3 when it comes to responsibility before third parties, it
should be the parties that affected by the action of negligence that would have to be
compensated for the damages done.

However, up to what point is this done or for that matter is there a legal system that is
well stated to deal with the liability of the ORs,? The answer up to now; many issues
contribute to this, and sadly the Maritimes administrations might share some fault.

The under-reporting of the cases of fraud and forgery of the certificates and documents
of ships, to the competent international maritime authorities and for that matter to IMO
itself, entity in charge of regulating such issues,

even though the member states might not have a legal procedure to proceed against
this informing the rest of the member states might help to reduce the recurrence of it.

Revoking the delegation agreement of the RO that is found not complying with the
agreement, followed up by international warning might be an excellent dissuasive for
future illegal actions;

However, up to now as is mention in the study cases A), B), and C) presented by the
author related to Honduras it can be seen that as much a monetary penalty is not
enough, there have to be more strict sanctions.
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Conclusion
The authenticity and integrity of the certificates is a matter that has to be taken
serious as all the documents shown above as an example of how serious and
yet so easily a document can be forged, since the certificates are documents
that will certify that the ship complies with the safety requirements, there has
to be more procedures in place to avoid this illegal actions.
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4. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Analysis of the Identification of weaknesses in the delegation of ROs
It was analysed the information given before in chapter one regarding the general
historical perspective, and it is possible to establish that given the increase of
classification societies/recognized organizations as the genesis of the problem;

seeing that there are more than one hundred organizations, that provide their services
to the member states, can at some point create a problem if not all of them have an
international or regional supervision body in charge of the regulation.
The classification societies not members of the 13IACS. In some cases lack the
installed capacity to provide high-quality maritime services; in chapter two the author
provided the functions of the ROs;

It was acknowledged that there is an undeniable fact that the services that ROs provide
in many cases and specifically for open registries might not have enough international
coverage, personnel with the technical expertise and overall the in-depth technical
experience as it is the case of Honduras.

When delegating authority to ROs, member states will display upon a prerequisite list
what the RO has to fulfil in order to be delegated in compliance with the national and
international conventions and guidelines.
Honduras, for that matter, has established 14nineteen requirements mentioned in
chapter 2, subtitle 2.4, under contractual responsibilities.
13
14

Ibid., Pg. 2
Ibid., Pg. 30
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The requirements have to fulfil the delegation that is granted, the issues if any, will
become evident, during verification of requirements even though this issues should be
detected before delegation.

The RO Code, Section 8, numeral 8.2, under legal basis, provides specific
requirements that have to be fulfilled by all maritime administrations; a total of 10
requirements are given, and the most important and the more relevant to our topic is
the last one, the flag state supervision.

As it was already mentioned the "Achilles´ heel" is the supervision of ROs that are
delegated by member states, but what about the delegation itself, procedure and
verification of procedures by which the delegation is given.

As mention in chapter 3, many state members do not have in place a national
legislation when it comes to the legal supervision and enforcement to these
organizations building a gap which in some cases may lead to forgery and fraud;

The weakness in the delegation contract in the case of Honduras is that there are not
enough technical resources to undertake the supervision of these organizations; the
delegation may only be done under the agreement of fair and legal service; in other
words, only base in trust.

Honduras has in its Organic Law, the mandate to assume annual audits to the
recognized organization, but in many cases because there is not enough personnel or
personnel with the technical knowledge these audits are not done and if so, they are
very superficial.

The reason why member states resort to ROs is for the same reason the delegation of
authority might fail in the supervision, and why these private organizations may be
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involved in illegal activities and the administrations might fall into serious safety
issues that can directly affect their national and international fleet.

4.2 The importance of PSC in supervision and enforcement.
The supervision and enforcement of the international conventions and regulations is a
responsibility of the Flag State as is mention by UNCLOS, but is it possible for the
flag state to do a proper supervision and enforcement of the vessels flying their flag at
an international level?

It is not, and in some cases might only be a reckless action of the flag states, but for
that case, the Port State Control comes as the best compliment for the member states.

It is paramount for the author to state that the work of the Port State Control does not
substitute the role of the flag state at any point; moreover, it supplements in a
synchronized manner.

It was though Resolution A. 682 (27) on 21 of November of the year 1991 that IMO
issue the Regional Co-Operation on the Control of Ships and Discharges, in order to
support the creation of the PSC as an aid for the countries to ensure the proper
application of the conventions and the regulations emanating from IMO itself.

The Port State Control has provided an incredible aid in the case of forged and
fraudulent documents, and in many cases, as is the one previously presented by the
case studies is the only means to detect them, as was shown in the case study A).

74

15

PSC, has become an essential aid for the states to ensure that the international

conventions and regulations, the figure of PSC gives the authority to boar a ship and
undertake an inspection and in the case of clear ground to detain it.

Before the PSC was only restricted for the revision of the certificates and documents
on board but not anymore and now the operational and the safety aspects of the ships
can also be inspected, and more detail inspection can be done. (Hare J., 1997)

However, for this dissertation the author will circumscribe the topic only to the
inspection of the certificates and the documents, that all ships most have onboard;
reminiscing the previous chapter and especially the case study 16A), wherein July on
the year of 2013, there was a detention that took the place of a vessel and following
the PSC of Braila, Rumania procedures the Flag State, in this case, Honduras, was
informed and the documents provided by the master of the ship where forwarded to
the administration and therefore the Safe Manning Document was detected as forged.

The administrations are encouraged to invest in the training and the employment of
surveyors and marine officer that can undertake the inspection with the technical
knowledge that is required to do so, since the final goal for all the maritime
administrations should be to eradicate all the sub-standards ships, this can only be
accomplished if the ports are well prepared to take that challenge and work in harmony
with the flag state authority.

15

Web sites of each MoU; European and North Atlantic region ：Paris MoU (http://www.parismou.org/) Asia-Pacific region
：Tokyo MOU (http://www.tokyo-mou.org/) Latin American region ：Viña del Mar (http://www.acuerdolatino.int.ar/)
Caribbean region ：Caribbean MOU (http://www.caribbeanmou.org/) Mediterranean region ：Mediterranean MOU
(http://www.medmou.org/) Indian Ocean region ：Indian Ocean MOU (http://www.iomou.org/) Black Sea region ：Black Sea
MOU (http://www.bsmou.org/) West and Central Africa region ：Abuja MOU (http://www.abujamou.org/) Arab States of the
Gulf ：Riyadh MOU (http://www.riyadhmou.org/)
16
Case study A) Detention By PSC Of A Ship With Fraudulent Certificates.
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4.3 Traditional Fraudulent Situations that can Arise from The Role of ORs.

As it was presented in chapter 3 throughout the study cases, there are particular
fraudulent situation that can be observed as repetitive issues under the role of
the legal delegation of ROs.
It was mention throughout the present dissertation that the actions of the ROs
have to be monitored and in the case where an administration is at a
disadvantage to carry on these supervision enforcement many cases of fraud
and forgery can come up.
The delegation agreement will provide the scope of action to which the RO
will be performing, never the less, if there is no appropriate supervision many
situation can occur;

Phantom ships can be one of those, since the delegation might cover only the
issuance of technical certificates and not the registration of vessels under the
flag of a given state member as it was in the case of Honduras.

It is common to find fraudulent or forged documents onboard ships calling in
international ports, these might be discovered as well as they might not be, and
the vessel will leave the port with no problem since there is not an international
database up to date where the PSC can verify such documents or for that matter
the scope of the delegation given to the ROs.

In the study case A) mention in chapter three, the vessel was detained, on the
grounds of many deficiencies being not the certificates some of them, never
the less the procedure of detention was done, and the documents sent to the
maritime administration;
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It is here where the safe manning certificate was discovered to be fraudulent
and moreover the signatures where forge, this is a clear proof of criminal
activity by the national laws of Honduras, in the database of the Honduran
registry the vessel was reported inactive.

This types of issues are common and similarly dangerous, since the conditions
of the ships cannot be monitored; it was as coincidence per se that the
documents and the ship were discovered by the PSC;

Nevertheless, the vessel was released under the display of documents of
exception issued by the OR, without being authorized to do so, a breach of the
delegation agreement and an act of illegality against the Honduras flag.

Was the RO delegated? By all means, it was, it had a delegation agreement,
but it was performing outside the scope of such agreement;

The supervision an proper monitoring of the RO can be a dissuasive tool to
avoid those issues but as it was mention before if the administration has not the
proper procedures established for that there will be no possible way to avoid
fraud and forgery.

Another way common fraudulent situation can be the ones that are discovered
by the referral of the shipowners as it was the case of the study case B); it was
by the inquire of the shipowner that the case of forged certificate including a
registration certificate was discovered.
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The RO that issued those certificates had done so on previous occasions, and
present year there were discovered a total of 4 cases of illegal issuance of
certificates.

The RO had a delegation agreement, this delegation agreement stated that the
scope of action would circumscribe only to ships that sail in national water of
the ones whose port of call was Honduras, the RO did not reported any action
that could call the attention of the administration, and it was until the shipowner
consulted about the documents was the time when the administration got to
know about the illegal actions.
Once again, the importance of having in place a proper system of monitoring
and enforcement for the ROs to which each member state delegated its
authority.

As is the case of the issuance of fraudulent certificates or the registration of
phantom vessel, these cases are not only by ROs that do not have a delegation
agreement, moreover it has been seen that the delegation agreement only opens
the door to these actions since they are appropriately delegated but the lack of
supervision or a national law and for that matter an international law to sanction
this cases some of the ROs can take comfort and procced to undertake those
illegal actions under complete iniquity.

4.4 Possible Way by Which the Forgery and Fraud can be Eradicated.
As mention by the author in chapter two, the responsibilities of ROs, are to act on
behalf of member states and member state has the responsibility to provide proper
supervision on the scope of action of ROs.
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The problem may arise when this supervision cannot be done for the same reason
that there was a need in first place to delegate the authority to an RO; contradictory
enough, is the fact that the security and safety international conventions prescribe the
use of the ROs to undertake the certification of ships.

In the specific case of Honduras, its Organic Law as the only specialize maritime
legal source establishes under its regulation of inspection, surveying, and issuance of
maritime safety certificates to ships registered under the Honduran flag, prescribes
the delegation but not a practical supervision method other than the vertical audits.

The delegation agreement is a national binding instrument, but if there is no
legal framework to enforce it the possibilities of sanction are null in the case
of a breach of contract, as seen under the case studies in chapter three,

None of the cases had a legal nation action other than an economic sanction,
even though it is a crime to forge the signature of a government authority.

The verification of the documents previous to sign a delegation agreement
might not be an assurance of the installed capacity of and OR to provide quality
services,

Verification of the documents can also be a source of fraudulent documents,
that were presented for the approval of delegation.

The only solution that can be observe viable at this point is a proper supervision
of the ROs, not only by the member state but by the IMO member states as a
whole;
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Establishing an international oversight program that can apply an unify criteria
od supervision as well as communication of results by the member states can
become a solution.

The IMO guidelines as the RO code, have proven not to be enough to fight
these recurrent issues; GISIS has also not given the results awaited;

Since the member states have not complied with the requirements of providing
the information to GISIS, regarding the ROs and the information that might be
in the system can, in some cases, be outdated.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION:
This dissertation has a primary objective to provide a broader window to a persistent
problem, and by that also to try to:


Identify the weaknesses when it comes to the delegation to the recognized
organizations when it comes to the requirements for the delegation itself.



To analyze the importance of the Port State Control (PSC) when ensuring the
legality of the technical certificates.



Describe in a whole the traditional fraudulent situation in the roles of the
recognize organizations through study cases.



Identify a range of procedures to avoid the fraud and forgery of documents in
the role of the recognized organizations.



Prescribe possible ways on how the IMO can help fight this persistent issue.

Many inhibitory aspects were mention as well as responsive ones, as in the PSC in the
case of detection of forged or fraudulent documents.

It was expected from the beginning of the research to acquire enough information
regarding the procedures as well as the number of incidents, from the maritime
administrations of countries that have an open registry,

Nevertheless, this was not accomplished for as much as the information that is
supposed to be public has been classified as confidential by these 32 countries.

Consequently, it could be argued that there is a lack of transparency regarding
important information that indirectly can contribute to the problem of forgery and
fraud by not having access to the cases and name of organizations that are recurrent in
these illegal actions, there has to be more
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It is the opinion of the author that the delegation of authority to the RO, has been for a
long time being taken slightly as the cases studies of fraud in chapter 3 where shown;

ROs with a delegation contract will have access to the documents of the
administrations and just relaying in a doubtlessly manner might lead to cases of fraud
and forgery being done without the knowledge of the administration and in decrement
of the maritime safety and security directly affecting the maritime trade.

It is evident that there is a lack of supervision on the side of the maritime
administrations, and this has to be acknowledged by IMO, with the same strength as it
has been done with the fraud and forgery of the certificates of competency of the
seafarers;

It has been in these cases that IMO through the member states have raised a flag and
had made all the efforts to eradicate it; the same effort shall be put in the case of ROs;
there has to be a more strict control at an international level.

It is understood through the research that the legal aspects of lability will and can
impede to create a universal tool for the supervision and sanction, but the legislation
will have eventually have to be changed, since the maritime trade as well as the
maritime crime evolves rapidly.

It was touched upon the PSC as one of the most efficient tools up to now to detect and
forged and fraudulent certificates and documents on board, it is not an infallible tool
but though time has become a dissuasive one,

It is for this reason that the maritime administration invest more in the constant training
of PSCO, since these are the only reassurance so far that the fraudulent and forge
documents can be detected.
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The cases that were presented in chapter 3, broadcasted an issue that might be
happening in many other maritime administrations, it was a significant setback on the
recollection of information not being able to have the information from the many
maritime administrations of the open registries regarding the cases of forgery and
falsification or for that matter the procedures in place to fight against this recurrent
issue, but at the end it can be deduced that the administrations refrained from providing
this information since it could put the maritime administrations in some disadvantage;
nevertheless the objective of the dissertation was accomplished.

As it was mention throughout the dissertation by the author, the overview of the ROs
will be a significant aid to fight this issue of illegality, but it is hard to demand proper
supervision of the ROs to the maritime administrations, since that will mean that the
administration will have to count on personnel with the technical knowledge;

Furthermore, in order to have more close supervision to count on the international level
presence, being this the reason why ROs are delegated would be preposterous, and that
is why the author recommended within this work and in many occasions the need to
have an international entity to undertake this supervision and audits to avoid the illegal
actions.

Recommendations
Based on the precedent conclusions, and the same time in the overall analysis of
present work, taking in considerations the findings and the milestones found in the
development of this present work the author would proceed to make the following
recommendations:

83

 There is a need to develop an international entity in charge of the overview of
the ROs that do not have the status of IACS, this is indeed a responsibility of
the flag states but it has been proven in some cases that there is no procedure
in place that can keep up with the growing market of ROs, which in some cases
are phantom organizations that lack entirely the minimum RO Code; there are
delegated and act on behalf of some administrations giving; as a result many
substandard vessels navigating in our international waters.
 PSC as a complementary tool for the enforcement of international conventions
as well as the guidelines on behalf of the member state, essential to remember
that it does not substitute the concomitant job of the flag state, has to be
improved technically, more investment has to be done on behalf of the member
states having more qualified personnel on the PSC can make a big difference
in the international fleets as well as the national fleets.

There has to be a global PSC data-based put in place where all the MoUs can
share information in realtime, where information query regarding any ship can
be made, and the information will be updated and readily available.
 There is the need to develop a special database of all the cases of forgery and
fraud committed and proved by the administrations, and this shall come in
handy when the decision of contracting an ROs is made; this will work as a
dissuasive tool for the irregular operating ROs to commit any illegal activity.
 Based on the fact that 32 of 35 maritime administrations refuse to give the
information requested which to some extent it should have been posted on the
GISIS, but it was not even though it is a mandate of IMO, shows that there is
a need to update and reinforce the maritime administrations of the member
states to update their information, since this is one source that could actually
help to avoid many cases of forgery and fraud by having access to the list of
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ROs that have been delegated and to what extent they have been delegated, this
would help the administrations, the PSC as well as the ship owners.

 The complexity of the legal situation when it comes to the sanction of this
international actor has to be taken in consideration but it should not be an
impediment, and there should be an international legal entity that could deal
with the issues of forgery and fraud at an international level and from a point
of view of an international problem that has a direct impact on the safety and
security of the international maritime community and not only to the country
in which the illegal activity takes place.
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